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I Got 99 Problems and They’re All FATCA
By Nirav (Jonathan) Dhanawade*
Abstract: Offshore personal income tax evasion accounts for approximately $50
billion in annual lost revenue for the United States. These large sums of money are
squirrelled away in tax havens⎯jurisdictions, such as Aruba, the Cayman Islands,
and Dubai, whose laws allow some U.S. citizens to evade paying their U.S. income
taxes. Before the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was enacted, U.S.
citizens could avoid taxes on passive income by not reporting this income to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To detect tax evasion, the IRS pursued U.S. citizens
with undeclared assets in foreign banks. But the IRS’s quest was largely unsuccessful
because foreign financial institutions did not fully report U.S. account holders’
information. While the IRS occasionally discovered offshore accounts, U.S. taxpayers
were largely on the “honor system.” Unfortunately, many U.S. taxpayers with
offshore accounts have been dishonest. As a result, Congress brought the hammer
down with FATCA to combat and, more importantly, prevent tax evasion. This
Comment discusses FATCA’s provisions, particularly those that have been heavily
criticized. It then explores these criticisms from a domestic and foreign perspective.
In doing so, this Comment examines and endorses Intergovernmental Agreements
(IGAs) as (1) a solution to FATCA’s shortcomings and (2) a building block for
developing a sustainable model of international tax transparency and information
reporting. Finally, this Comment argues that the United States should continue
working with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development towards
the adoption of a multilateral automatic information exchange standard that will
enhance tax transparency and reduce tax evasion at an international level.

* J.D., 2015, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 2011, University of Delaware. Every one
of my accomplishments is attributable to the grace of God and the kindness of others. This Comment is
no different. I thank David Miller for his keen insight and advice, and my colleagues at the
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business for their thoughtful input and time. This
Comment is as much theirs as it is mine. I also owe a great deal of gratitude to my wife, Maja, for
coming up with the title of this Comment and for her unwavering support in all of my endeavors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A Swiss banker met his U.S. client in a remote-controlled elevator
where bank statements, tucked within a Sports Illustrated magazine,
exchanged hands.1 Another Swiss banker hauled bags of cash across the
United States to help his U.S. clients avoid taxes.2 Both men worked for
Credit Suisse AG, the target of a U.S. Department of Justice investigation
that is expected to end in a settlement exceeding $780 million.3 Fourteen
other banks, including rival UBS AG, are also being probed for helping
U.S. citizens evade taxes through secret overseas accounts.4 One of these
U.S. citizens⎯Beanie Babies creator and billionaire, H. Ty Warner⎯hid
$25 million in overseas accounts.5 Standing before a federal judge in
Chicago, the sixty-nine-year-old businessman tearfully admitted that he
evaded $5 million in taxes.6
At first glance, U.S. tax evasion seems like a trivial problem,
especially in comparison to ostensibly more pressing issues facing
Americans, including obesity,7 poor health care,8 and, of course, realitytelevision-induced brain drain.9 But believe it or not, U.S. tax evasion has
earned its place on the wall of shame. Offshore personal income tax
evasion accounts for around $50 billion in annual lost revenue for the
United States.10 These large sums of money are squirrelled away in tax
1
Andrew Grossman, John Letzing & Laura Saunders, Ex-Banker’s Plea Deal Outlines Trail of a TaxEvasion Scheme, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304914904579435090290201078?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.
com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052%20702304914904579435090290201078.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Susannah Nesmith & David Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker Lack Pleads Guilty in U.S. Tax Case,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-26/ex-ubs-bankerlack-pleads-guilty-in-u-s-tax-case.html.
5
Beanie Babies Creator Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion, NBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2013, 3:28 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/beanie-babies-creator-pleads-guilty-tax-evasion-8C11323460.
6
Id.
7
See Overweight and Obesity, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
obesity/data/facts.html (last updated Sept. 3, 2014) (discussing the “dramatic rise in obesity” in the
United States).
8
See, e.g., The Shame of American Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/18/opinion/the-shame-of-american-health-care.html?_r=0 (“[B]y virtually all measures of
cost, access to care and ease of dealing with insurance problems, Americans fared poorly compared with
people in other advanced countries.”).
9
See, e.g., Melissa Dahl, Watching ‘Jersey Shore’ Might Make You Dumber, Study Suggests, NBC
NEWS (Jun. 17, 2011, 6:20 AM), http://bodyodd.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/06/ 17/6851542-watching-jerseyshore-might-make-you-dumber-study-suggests?lite (discussing media priming: the “idea that the things
we watch or listen to or read influence[s] our emotions and our behavior”).
10
Frederic Behrens, Comment, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 205, 207 (2013) (citing Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax
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havens⎯jurisdictions, such as Aruba, the Cayman Islands, and Dubai,
whose laws allow some U.S. citizens to evade paying their U.S. income
taxes.11 Before the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)12 was
enacted, U.S. citizens could avoid taxes on passive income, including
interest, dividends, and capital gains, by not reporting this income to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).13
To detect tax evasion, the IRS pursued U.S. citizens with undeclared
assets in foreign banks.14 But its quest was largely unsuccessful15 because
foreign financial institutions (FFIs) did not fully report U.S. account
holders’ information.16 While the IRS occasionally discovered offshore
accounts, U.S. taxpayers were largely on the “honor system.”17
Unfortunately, many U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts have been
dishonest.18 As a result, Congress brought the hammer down with FATCA
to combat and, more importantly, prevent tax evasion.19
This Comment argues that the United States should continue working
with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) towards the adoption of a multilateral automatic information
exchange standard that will enhance tax transparency and reduce tax
evasion at an international level. This Comment proceeds as follows: Part
II discusses FATCA’s provisions, particularly those that have been heavily
criticized. Part III explores these criticisms from a domestic and foreign
perspective. In Part IV, this Comment reviews the tax transparency and
information exchange standards proposed by the Global Forum on Tax
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global
Forum). Finally, Part V utilizes these standards to examine and endorse
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) as (1) a solution to FATCA’s
shortcomings and (2) a building block for developing a sustainable model
of international tax transparency and information reporting.

Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 132 (2009)).
11
Id. at 206.
12
FATCA is a federal law aimed at reducing tax evasion by U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts.
See infra Part II.
13
Behrens, supra note 10, at 206–07.
14
Id. at 207.
15
J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential
Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 473 (2012).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2968–69 (2011).
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II. KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID: FATCA DELINEATED
Congress’s primary goal in passing FATCA was to prevent tax evasion
by U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts.20 Specifically, FATCA was
designed to address the “deliberate and illegal hiding of assets and income
from the IRS by U.S. citizens and residents.”21 Legislation was introduced
in October 200922 and modified in December 200923 before FATCA was
finally adopted as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act
in March 2010.24
FATCA’s approach is two-pronged with one prong addressing
individual taxpayers and the other prong addressing FFIs.25 The following
sections explore FATCA’s dual-pronged approach.
A. The People Problem: § 6038D
FATCA enacted § 6038D, which requires individuals holding “any
interest in a specified foreign financial asset” to disclose these assets in
their Form 1040 if the assets’ aggregate value exceeds $50,000 during “any
taxable year.”26 This reporting requirement took effect with 2011 income
tax returns.27 Section 6038D(b) defines a “specified foreign financial asset”
as follows:
(1) any financial account . . . maintained by [an FFI] . . . , and
(2) any of the following assets which are not held in an account
maintained by a financial institution . . .
(A) any stock or security issued by a person other than a United
States person,
20
See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS.,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last updated June 9, 2014)
(“FATCA was enacted in 2010 by Congress to target non-compliance by U.S. taxpayers using foreign
accounts.”).
21
Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service).
22
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, H.R. 3933, 111th Cong. (2009).
23
H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010).
24
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–535, 124 Stat. 71,
97–115 (2010).
25
Id.
26
I.R.C. § 6038D (2010).
27
Id.
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(B) any financial instrument or contract held for investment that
has an issuer or counterparty which is other than a United States
person, and
(C) any interest in a foreign entity.28
Under § 6038D(h)(1), the IRS can also create exceptions to these reporting
requirements to avoid duplicative disclosures.29
1. Big Brother is Watching: Required Information Reporting
Section 6038D(c) specifies the following foreign asset information that
U.S. taxpayers must disclose: (1) the name and final address of the FFI
where assets are maintained, including the number of the account; (2) for
stocks or securities, “the name and address of the issuer” and any other
relevant information necessary to identify the stock or security’s class or
issue; (3) for instruments, contracts, or interests, “such information as is
necessary to identify such instrument[s], contract[s], or interest[s]” and “the
names and addresses of all issuers and counterparties”; and (4) the assets’
maximum values during the taxable year.30
2. Few Carrots, Mostly Sticks: Penalties Under § 6038D
If individual taxpayers fail to disclose the foreign asset information
required under § 6038D(c), FATCA penalizes them $10,000.31 If a
taxpayer still fails to disclose this information for more than ninety days
after notification by the IRS, the taxpayer is levied an additional penalty of
$10,000 for each thirty-day period or fraction thereof.32
FATCA attempts to balance this “stick” with a “carrot.” Section
6038D(g) permits a waiver of the penalties described above if the failure to
disclose required foreign asset information was due to “reasonable cause
and not due to willful neglect.”33 Still, this carrot is tempered by the
28

Id.
Id. § 6038D(h)(1); see also Alan S. Lederman & Bobbe Hirsh, The American Assault on Tax
Havens-Status Report, 44 INT’L LAW. 1141, 1142 (2010) (stating that the IRS can create exceptions to
“passive foreign investment company (PFIC) and controlled foreign corporation stockownership
reporting”).
30
I.R.C. § 6038D(c) (2010).
31
Id. § 6038D(d)(1).
32
Id. § 6038D(d)(2). But any additional penalties imposed under § 6038D(d)(2) cannot exceed
$50,000. Id.
33
Id. § 6038D(g).
29
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provision that foreign secrecy laws do not constitute “reasonable cause.”34
Additionally, the $50,000 threshold for mandatory disclosures is considered
met (1) if the IRS discovers specified foreign financial assets, and (2) if the
taxpayer fails to provide sufficient information indicating that the total
value of these assets does not exceed $50,000.35
FATCA also imposes a stiff 40% penalty on financial understatements
of undisclosed financial assets.36 Notably, understatements of financial
statements exceeding $5,000 are still fair game even if the existing threeyear statute of limitations has run because § 6501 permits for its extension
under these circumstances.37 With FATCA’s approach to addressing
individual taxpayers as a backdrop, the following section examines
FATCA’s approach to FFIs.
B. FFIs and Non-FFIs: §§ 1471 and 1472
FATCA’s second prong addresses FFIs.38 Specifically, FATCA
imposes a 30% tax on “withholdable payments” to FFIs that meet § 1471’s
criteria.39 FATCA also imposes a 30% tax on withholdable payments to
certain foreign entities that are not FFIs (non-FFIs).40 The following
subsections (1) define FFIs and “withholdable payments,” (2) discuss the
30% withholdable tax, and (3) distinguish FATCA’s tax withholding
system from another tax withholding system that the United States already
employs.
1. How to Spot an FFI
Section 1471(d)(4) defines an FFI as “any financial institution which is
a foreign entity,” not including financial institutions organized “under the
laws of any possession of the United States.”41 Thus, FFIs are defined
34

Id.
Id. § 6038D(e).
36
See The Section 6662(e) Substantial and Gross Valuation Misstatement Penalty, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-apa/penalties6662_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
37
I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2010).
38
See id. §§ 1471, 1472.
39
See id. § 1471(a). The withholding tax does not apply to FFIs that enter into an FFI Agreement
with the IRS. But FFIs must deduct 30% of any passthru payment to either a recalcitrant account holder
or other FFI that has not entered into an FFI Agreement. Id. § 1471(b)(1)(D).
40
Id. § 1472.
41
Id. § 1471. Section 1471(d)(5) defines “financial institution” as any entity that does one of the
following:
(A) accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business,
(B) as a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account of others,
35

145

_JD_DHANAWADE FINAL READ_2.7.2015.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/12/15 8:12 AM

35:139 (2014)

broadly to include foreign banks, trust companies, brokerage firms, mutual
funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds.42
2. Demystifying “Withholdable Payments”
Congress through § 1473 defined “withholdable payments” as the
following:
(i) any payment of interest (including any original issue
discount), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities,
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or
determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, if
such payment is from sources within the United States, and
(ii) any gross proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any
property of a type which can produce interest or dividends from
sources within the United States.43
Section 1473 also defines “withholding agent” as “all persons, in
whatever capacity acting, having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or
payment of any withholdable payment.”44 Thus, income that would
otherwise be exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code may
now be subject to FFI withholding under FATCA unless an FFI enters into
an FFI Agreement.45
3. FFIs’ Guide to Avoiding the Withholding Tax
While a 30% withholding tax might seem harsh, FATCA provides
FFIs with a way to avoid the tax⎯compliance.46 Specifically, § 1471(b)
provides that FFIs can avoid the 30% withholding tax by taking the
following steps: (1) identifying their U.S. accounts; (2) complying with due
diligence and verification procedures regarding possible U.S. accounts;
or
(C) is engaged . . . primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities . . . , partnership interests, commodities . . . , or any interest . . . in such
securities, partnership interests, or commodities.
Id.
42

Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1143.
I.R.C. § 1473 (2010).
44
Id. § 1473(4).
45
Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1144 (stating that withholdable payments encompass capital
gains, portfolio interest, bank deposit interest, and recovery costs of U.S. stocks and bonds).
46
See I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2010).
43
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(3) annually reporting information about these U.S. accounts to the IRS;
(4) withholding the 30% FATCA tax, or be withheld upon, on passthru
payments to other FFIs that did not enter into FFI agreements with the IRS,
or on payments to recalcitrant account holders who fail to supply
information regarding U.S. account ownership; (5) complying with any IRS
requests for additional information about U.S. accounts; and (6) if foreign
law prevents disclosure, seeking a waiver of the law or closing the account
in question if a waiver cannot be obtained.47
Under § 1471(b)(2)(A), an FFI can also avoid the 30% withholding tax
if (1) the FFI complies with IRS procedures ensuring that it does not
maintain U.S. accounts and meets requirements prescribed by the IRS
regarding other FFIs’ accounts, (2) the FFI is a “member of a class of
institutions” for which the IRS creates an exception,48 or (3) the FFI does
not invest in U.S. assets.49
Having described FATCA’s provisions, the following subsection now
distinguishes FATCA’s withholding system from that of its predecessor.
4. Distinguishing FATCA Withholding from Chapter 3
Withholding
Prior to FATCA’s enactment, the United States already employed a
tax withholding system under Chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code.50
Under Chapter 3, a withholding agent must withhold 30% of any U.S.source payment, including fixed, determinable annual, or periodical
(FDAP) income made to foreign persons.51 But unlike FATCA’s tax
withholding system, which applies to all U.S.-source payments to FFIs and
certain Non-Financial Foreign Entities,52 Chapter 3 withholding only
applies to payments to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations.53
FATCA also imposes a withholding tax on gross proceeds from the
sale or disposition of income-producing property from a U.S. source, and
FDAP income.54 FATCA withholding is therefore fundamentally different
from Chapter 3 withholding, but collectively, these mechanisms produce a
more robust withholding structure than previously existed.
47

Id.
Id. (“[S]uch institution is a member of a class of institutions [that] . . . the Secretary has
determined that the application of this section is not necessary to carry out the purposes of this
section.”).
49
See id. § 1473(1).
50
See id. § 1441.
51
Id.
52
See id. § 1472.
53
See id. §§ 1441–1442.
54
Id. § 1473(1)(A)(ii); see also id. § 1441(b).
48
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III. READING THE COMMENT BOX: WHAT’S WRONG WITH
FATCA?
Despite the United States’ legitimate need to detect and deter offshore
personal income tax evasion, FATCA’s passage was commemorated with
much gnashing of teeth⎯a sentiment that continues to grow.55 The
following sections explore the complaints of U.S. banks and U.S. citizens
living abroad, as well as foreign countries and their financial institutions.
A. The Overseas Outcry
To avoid complying with FATCA’s disclosure requirements, some
FFIs are severing ties with their U.S. account holders.56 These FFIs cite the
costs of compliance as the reason for their decision.57 Consequently, some
U.S. citizens living abroad criticize FATCA for making it difficult for them
to establish and maintain foreign bank accounts.58
Alarmingly, even more U.S. citizens living abroad could face account
closures if their foreign banks cannot comply with FATCA’s disclosure
requirements.59 This is likely to happen when a bank is not large enough to
comply, but is simultaneously too large to altogether avoid U.S.
investments.60 As a result, these U.S. citizens may be limited to opening
and maintaining accounts with smaller foreign banks that do not hold any
U.S. portfolios.61 Certain critics, including Marylouise Serrato and
Jacqueline Bugnion of American Citizens Abroad,62 predict that eventual
FATCA exclusions might also cause these U.S. citizens to have difficulty
purchasing foreign insurance policies and pension funds.63
Therefore, for some U.S. citizens living abroad, the burden of
complying with FATCA’s individual reporting requirements trumps the

55

See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 21, at 7.
Joanna Heiberg, FATCA: Toward A Multilateral Automatic Information Reporting Regime, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1685, 1702 (2012).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1147.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
American Citizens Abroad is an organization that claims to represent the interests of U.S. citizens
residing overseas. See FAQ about ACA, Inc., AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, https://americansabroad.org/
about/faq-about-aca-inc/ (last updated Oct. 10, 2013).
63
Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 29, at 1147. FFIs might altogether refuse to deal with U.S.
citizens living abroad. Olga Basko, FATCA: Taxes Just Got More Complicated, COL. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE (Dec. 3, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12917.
56
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advantages of U.S. citizenship.64 But the U.S. Department of State does not
let these patriots off the hook easily⎯renunciation comes with a $450 price
tag.65 Former U.S. citizens are also not relieved of their existing tax
liabilities and penalties owed.66 Moreover, Uncle Sam levies a special “exit
tax” on the soon-to-be-former U.S. citizens with a net worth of at least $2
million, or an annual income of about $150,000.67 So while renunciation
allows U.S. citizens living abroad to avoid FATCA’s reporting
requirements, it comes at a considerable price.
B. The Tax Treaty Veto
A second criticism of FATCA is that it effectively constitutes a taxtreaty veto by overriding contradictory provisions in existing income-tax
treaties.68
FATCA’s information reporting requirements are more
demanding than those of existing tax treaties.69 And as discussed above,
FATCA imposes a 30% withholding tax on noncompliant FFIs regardless
of their withholding rates under existing tax treaties.70 Under some tax
treaties, certain taxpayers can obtain reduced withholding rates through a
refund mechanism.71
But courtesy of FATCA, these preferential
withholding rates do not apply when an FFI is a payee.72
C. Shhh! Bank Secrecy Concerns
FATCA also creates concerns in the realm of local bank-secrecy laws
because many foreign countries do not allow their banks or financial
institutions to divulge clients’ information to other governments.73
64

Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1702.
Id. at 1703.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See id.; see also id. at 7, 62 (“Treaty overrides adversely affect the treaty-making process and
historically have been avoided unless essential to the ends sought by the legislation.”).
69
Id. at 1703.
70
Id. (discussing how FATCA’s provisions override those of governing tax treaties).
71
Id. For examples of existing tax refund mechanisms, see I.R.C. § 1445(c)(1)(C) (2012).
“Economic double taxation” occurs when two or more countries tax an individual or entity on the same
income. To avoid economic double taxation, domestic tax laws can (1) employ the credit method by
providing credit against domestic taxes for foreign taxes paid on the same income or (2) exempt the
income from domestic taxation. Internal Revenue Manual – 4.60.3 Tax Treaty Related Matters, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/ irm/part4/irm_04-060-003.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
72
Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1703–04.
73
See, e.g., David Jolly & Brian Knowlton, Law to Find Tax Evaders Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 2011, at B1 (quoting Jeffrey Owens, tax expert at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) (“Enforcement of the law will be tricky, as many countries . . . forbid banks or companies
65
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Moreover, FATCA requires FFIs and foreign banks to deny accounts to
U.S. citizens if they cannot comply with its reporting requirements.74
But for some FFIs, simply avoiding U.S. assets may not be enough
because, under FATCA’s passthru reporting requirement, certain non-U.S.
income is subject to required reporting if the income is attributable to a
withholdable payment.75 Some critics argue that the passthru provision
forces foreign banks to ensure that all of their non-U.S. funds comply with
FATCA’s reporting requirement.76 One of these critics, the British
Bankers’ Association (BBA), labeled the passthru payment “simply
unworkable.”77 Cue Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs).
D. More Money, More (Local) Problems
Within FATCA’s framework, IGAs involve FFIs reporting U.S.
account holders’ information to their respective national tax authorities that,
in turn, provide this information to the United States.78 Under existing nonFATCA IGAs, U.S. banks already provide substantial information to
foreign governments.79 The IGA approach, discussed in greater detail in
Part V of this Comment, circumvents the legal impediments that FATCA
poses.80 IGAs also reduce FFIs’ burden of compliance by allowing them to
report U.S.-account information through their respective national
governments.81 The IGA approach is therefore the solution to the
previously referenced criticism by the BBA.82
Under FATCA, U.S. banks will need to develop and maintain systems
tying account holders’ nationalities to their respective accounts.83
FATCA’s critics argue that this is currently unfeasible given the lack of
to transfer such information directly to a foreign government.”). Countries such as Switzerland are
popular destinations for U.S. citizens looking to set up a “nest egg” overseas. See, e.g., Mark Nestmann,
Despite Tightening of U.S. Laws, Switzerland Remains a Safe Haven for Money, HEARTLAND INST.
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2014/08/05/despite-united-states-lawsswitzerland-still-safe-haven-money.
74
Behrens, supra note 10, at 222.
75
See I.R.C. § 1471 (2010). Regulations have delayed withholding passthru payments until 2017 at
the earliest. See generally IRS, NOTICE 2013-43, REVISED TIMELINE AND OTHER GUIDANCE
REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FATCA (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n13-43.pdf.
76
Behrens, supra note 10, at 221.
77
Id.
78
FATCA Key Terms, THOMSON REUTERS, http://fatca.thomsonreuters.com/about-fatca/key-terms/
(last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
79
See Behrens, supra note 10, at 222.
80
See id. at 215.
81
Id.
82
See id. at 221.
83
Id. at 222.
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existing regulations directing U.S. banks.84
This is, however, an
exaggerated claim because existing antiterrorism and money laundering
laws currently place U.S. banks in a better position than ever before to
implement FATCA’s measures.85 A related criticism, that FATCA’s
compliance measures will raise the cost of domestic banking services for
retail U.S. customers, is at best unclear.86
E. More Money, More (Foreign) Problems
Yet another criticism of FATCA is that its requirements place a high
financial burden on FFIs.87 For example, the Institute of International
Bankers (the Institute) predicts that compliance with FATCA might cost
international banks over $250 million.88 Other foreign businesses predict
that annual compliance costs might actually be billions of dollars.89 But
these numbers are mere predictions.90 For example, in reaching the
aforementioned $250 million figure, the Institute stated that “several large
institutions” estimated on a “conservative basis” that they would incur an
average cost of $10 per account to properly identify and document
customers’ accounts.91 The Institute did not specify (1) which institutions
made the $10-an-account prediction, (2) why this prediction is accurate, and
(3) how this prediction is “conservative.”92 So while the Institute has
thrown around some big numbers, none of them are currently verifiable.

84

Id.
See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2010); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
86
Behrens, supra note 10, at 222. Because FATCA has yet to be fully implemented, speculation
about U.S. banks shifting their increased costs of compliance on to retail U.S. consumers is just
that⎯speculation. Nonetheless, as Behrens correctly states, U.S. banks are currently in a better position
than ever before to implement FATCA’s compliance measures because of antiterrorism and money
laundering laws currently in force. Thus, the additional cost of FATCA-specific compliance remains
unclear. Similarly, the degree to which this compliance will affect U.S. retail consumers is equally
unclear. See id.
87
Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1704.
88
Id. at 1704–05.
89
Id. at 1705.
90
See EUR. BANKING FED’N & INST. OF INT’L BANKERS, COMMENTS ON NOTICE 2010-60 PROVIDING
PRELIMINARY
GUIDANCE
ON
FATCA
(Nov.
12,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cticompliance.com/assets/pdf/EBF-IIB%202010%2011%2012.pdf (“Our members are still
attempting to quantify the potential cost [of FATCA] . . . preliminary indications are that costs will be
staggering.”) (emphasis added).
91
Id.
92
See generally id.
85
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Relatedly, critics assert that FATCA might cause some FFIs to
altogether avoid investing in the United States.93 This, in turn, might
discourage future U.S. investments by other FFIs, or it might shift the costs
of compliance on to American investors.94 But, as with the Institute’s $10an-account prediction, it is still too early to verify or discredit this criticism.
F. Complexity, Confusion, Calamity?
Lastly, critics, including the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS),95 bash
FATCA for worsening an already complex and confusing system of
international taxation.96 According to these critics, the IRS should focus on
taxpayer services, not international law enforcement.97 But they seem to
have forgotten that it was Congress, the most representative branch of the
U.S. government,98 and not the IRS, that passed FATCA.99 Thus, the IRS
does not have any choice but to enforce FATCA. A more logical complaint
might be the lack of clear guidance provided to the IRS by Congress, but
alas, FATCA bashing is the TAS’s province.
IV. LESSONS FROM OVERSEAS: THE GLOBAL FORUM’S
APPROACH
The preceding sections described FATCA’s origin, design, and
defects. The following section discusses the Global Forum and explains the
tax transparency and information exchange standards that it has proposed.
These standards are then used to propose modifications to FATCA’s
approach.
A. Not Just Another Useless International Organization
The Global Forum is the continuation of a forum created by the OECD
to address tax compliance issues caused by tax havens.100 It originally
93

Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1705.
Id.
95
The Taxpayer Advocate Service is an independent organization within the IRS that espouses to be
the taxpayers’ “voice at the IRS.” See The Taxpayer Advocate Service is Your Voice at the IRS, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Advocate/The-Taxpayer-Advocate-Service-Is-Your-Voice-at-the-IRS (last updated
Mar. 14, 2014).
96
See Heiberg, supra note 56, at 1706.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (2010).
99
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501–535,
124 Stat. 71, 97–115 (2010).
100
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, OECD,
94
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consisted of OECD countries and jurisdictions that agreed to exchange taxrelated information to achieve greater tax transparency.101 The Global
Forum was restructured in 2009 to strengthen this exchange of
information.102
1. The Emergence of International Tax Standards
In 2009, the Group of Twenty (G20)103 expressed willingness to
sanction jurisdictions that were reluctant to adopt the tax standards of the
2002 OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters
and the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital.104 Since
then, an ever-increasing number of countries have cooperatively adopted
international tax standards, thereby indicating a willingness to set aside
traditional notions of sovereignty on tax matters in exchange for transparent
sovereignty⎯something that is critical for modern governance.105
Initiatives to coordinate tax policies between countries have been
proposed for years, especially because tax havens have become increasingly
burdensome to industrialized countries.106 Because most governments want
to limit their use, the appropriate means of dealing with tax havens has
become a vigorous debate.107
2. Membership
As of November 2014, the Global Forum is comprised of 123
members, on equal footing, that are committed to implementing
international standards of tax transparency and exchange of information.108
Developing countries are invited to join the Global Forum and benefit from
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Formed in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1999, the G20 is a bloc of nineteen countries
and the European Union that meets annually to discuss “ways to strengthen the global economy, reform
international financial institutions, improve finance regulation and implement the key economic reforms
that are needed in each member economy.” About G20, G20, https://www.g20.org/about_G20 (last
visited Aug. 21, 2014).
104
Miguel González Marcos, Seclusion in (Fiscal) Paradise is Not an Option: The OECD Harmful
Tax Practices Initiative and Offshore Financial Centers, 24 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2011).
105
Id. at 5. Tax havens “(1) rob prosperous industrialized countries of their tax revenues; (2) permit
too much bank, corporate and individual secrecy; and (3) lack vigor in the fight against money
laundering.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
106
See id.
107
See id. at 6–7.
108
Members of the Global Forum, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/membersofthe
globalforum.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
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these standards,109 with members’ compliance enforced through an in-depth
peer review and monitoring process.110
B. Examining the Playbook: Keys to Success
The Global Forum’s success is attributable to its emphasis on
coordination, balance, and multilateral tax treaties.
The following
subsections explore each of those elements in greater detail.
1. Coordination
Coordination between countries is necessary to effectively address the
cross-border problem of offshore tax evasion. But to facilitate and sustain
intrajurisdictional cooperation, countries’ respective tax revenues must be
linked to their shared goals.111 Specifically, industrialized countries must
recognize and address developing countries’ goals, such as equitable
distribution of tax revenues, better resource allocation, discouragement of
economic crimes, and furtherance of institutional quality and growth.112
The process of reaching these multilateral agreements must also be fair,
transparent, and participatory, granting equal footing to all potential
signatories.113
2. Balance
Another impediment to securing and sustaining multilateral tax treaties
is countries’ legitimate fear of losing sovereignty.114 Balancing national
sovereignty and compliance with international tax standards is critical
because tax evasion is a global problem; it cannot be effectively overcome
through national policies alone.115
Thus, countries that adopt international tax standards must reconcile
their dual interests in maintaining national sovereignty and complying with

109
Frequently Asked Questions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/Frequently
%20asked%20questions.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
110
Id. All Global Forum members undergo peer reviews of their implementation of international
tax standards. These peer reviews involve the following two phases: (1) a review of each jurisdiction’s
legal and regulatory framework for tax transparency and exchange of information, and (2) a review and
subsequent rating of the practical implementation of the tax standards. Id.
111
See Marcos, supra note 104, at 30.
112
Id. at 30–31.
113
Id. at 32.
114
Id. at 27.
115
Id. at 27–28.
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foreign demands for transparency.116 In doing so, countries should consider
(1) modifying their existing domestic tax laws to comply with international
tax standards, (2) the negative effects of limiting access to FFIs, (3) the
projected income loss from decreased offshore financial services and
alternate sources of revenue, and (4) ways of balancing the exchange of
information with foreign countries and domestic citizens’ right to
privacy.117
International tax standards can also produce inefficient results in the
“global allocation of capital” if certain countries’ domestic tax laws do not
reflect principles of international tax neutrality.118
To avoid this
undesirable hodgepodge, countries should collaboratively analyze how
international tax standards can be used to provide developmental
assistance.119
3. Multilateral Tax Treaties
In addition to coordination and balance, jurisdictions must consider
how to adopt and implement international tax transparency and information
exchange standards⎯unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally. The United
States currently has bilateral income tax treaties with sixty-eight
countries.120 However, bilateral tax treaties may be inadequate when
jurisdictions’ domestic tax policies closely resemble one another.121
In fact, bilateral tax treaties might even boost tax havens’ appeal as
destinations for establishing business ventures because of the superficial
display of good governance that could result after entering into these
treaties.122 Therefore, multilateral tax treaties are a long-term solution to
combatting offshore tax evasion because they are better suited to foster
cooperation and balance between countries seeking to adopt and implement
international tax standards.123

116

Id. at 34.
Id.
118
Id. at 22–23. Developing countries fear that tax coordination will only benefit their more
industrialized counterparts. See id.
119
Id. at 23–24.
120
United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/InternationalBusinesses/United-States-Income-Tax-Treaties---A-to-Z (last updated Oct. 21, 2013).
121
Marcos, supra note 104, at 25–26.
122
See id. at 26. Because bilateral tax treaties do not promote international coordination,
cooperation, or even coercion to the extent that their multilateral counterparts do, they are less likely to
induce true tax transparency in signatory tax havens. See id. at 26 n.143.
123
Id.
117
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V. THE BLUEPRINT: IGAS
The Global Forum operates within a cooperative, balanced, and
multilateral framework.124 Countries on equal footing draft, adopt, and
implement international standards of tax transparency and exchange of
information.125 But the Global Forum’s impact is limited to individual
countries’ initiative to modify their domestic tax laws in compliance with
international standards.126 Unfortunately, the Global Forum lacks a
punitive means of addressing noncompliant jurisdictions that denounce its
message, or that just accept it superficially without making any tangible
changes to their domestic tax laws.
By enacting FATCA and reforming its domestic tax laws, the United
States wholeheartedly embraced the Global Forum’s gospel.127
Surprisingly, however, some of FATCA’s foreign critics are also members
of the Global Forum.128 (Et tu, Brute?) Foreign banks, including those in
countries belonging to the Global Forum, have also harshly criticized the
legislation.129
This backlash can be traced to FATCA’s misplaced reliance on a
bank-to-residence government (B2G) approach to international tax
information reporting.130 This section examines that misplaced reliance and
then suggests a better approach that is already gaining traction⎯IGAs.
A. Fundamentally Flawed: The B2G Approach
FATCA’s B2G approach leaves foreign governments completely out
of the “information reporting chain” relying instead on full compliance by
FFIs.131 While this approach provides greater simplicity, FATCA cannot
realistically solve the United States’ offshore tax evasion problem without
collaborating with foreign governments.132 Additionally, levying the 30%
124
See OECD, IMPLEMENTING THE TAX TRANSPARENCY STANDARDS: A HANDBOOK FOR
ASSESSORS & JURISDICTIONS 7 (2010).
125
Id.
126
See, e.g., Angel Gurria, Sec’y-Gen., OECD, Opening Remarks at the Fourth Meeting of the
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Oct. 25, 2011) (stating
that Belgium, Malaysia, Luxembourg, and the Philippines have taken domestic action to improve other
countries’ access to their tax information) (emphasis added).
127
See generally id. (stating that the battle for fairer international tax laws involves countries
amending their domestic tax laws).
128
Behrens, supra note 10, at 210.
129
Id. at 210–11.
130
See Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L.
REV. 529, 530 (2012).
131
Id.
132
Id. FFIs are unlikely to comply with FATCA, an exclusively American law, if doing so violates
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withholding tax on noncompliant FFIs would inevitably damage the United
States’ relationship with both the FFIs and foreign governments.133
Conversely, ineffectual enforcement of FATCA’s provisions severely
diminishes its viability as a means of combating offshore tax evasion.
B. Let Us Take a Moment and Give Thanks
It would be unfair, however, to continue discussing FATCA’s flaws
without also crediting the law for its innovative push towards increased
transparency in international tax reporting and information exchange. First,
FATCA’s 30% withholding tax covers practically all returns from financial
investment accounts.134 FATCA’s scope is also not limited to proceeds
from gains on sale; it covers all gross proceeds from sales.135 This is a
noteworthy feat because collecting the right amount of taxes on U.S.-source
investment returns is an age-old problem that FATCA’s predecessor, the
U.S. “qualified intermediary” (QI) program, did not adequately address.136
Second, FATCA employs source withholding in requiring account
disclosure regardless of whether the account generates U.S.-source income
or if it is simply held by an FFI.137 FATCA also effectively uses the threat
of source withholding on U.S.-source investment accounts to prompt the
disclosure of other accounts owned by U.S. citizens.138
Third, FATCA requires FFIs to determine whether de facto U.S.
ownership exists instead of simply relying on clients’ assertions of their tax
status or residence.139 This is a sharp departure from the QI program’s
“know your customer” diligence rules that restricted additional
investigation to situations where criminal activity seemed probable.140
FATCA’s stringent diligence requirements also contrast with the general
principle that tax preparers can rely on taxpayers’ representations absent a

their host country’s bank secrecy laws, or if the costs of compliance greatly outweigh the continued
benefits of retaining U.S. account holders.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 535.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 530, 532. The QI program did not provide the U.S. government with information about
U.S. investors. Unlike FATCA, the model QI agreement also did not contain significant withholding
penalties. But the QI program’s biggest drawback was its broad definition of a “beneficial owner,”
which included corporations. Thus, to circumvent the QI program’s rules, a U.S. taxpayer could form a
non-U.S. shell corporation and list it as the account owner. Then, magically, a “bona fide non-U.S.
person” would own the corporation, relieving it of compliance with the QI rules. See id. at 532–35.
137
See id. at 535.
138
See id.
139
See id.
140
Id. at 532, 533 & n.24.
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valid reason to think otherwise.141
Finally, FATCA does not assume that a corporation is the beneficial
owner. Instead it requires FFIs to report accounts in which a U.S. citizen
holds more than 10% of the equity.142 In taking this approach, FATCA
discards a traditional principle of American governance: treating
corporations as taxpayers under U.S. federal income tax law.143
Given the reasons described above, FATCA is undoubtedly an
innovative piece of legislation, but impediments to its successful
implementation include undesirable capital market disruptions, foreign
bank secrecy laws that limit FFIs’ means and extent of compliance, and the
United States’ limited jurisdiction to verify FFIs’ compliance.
C. There is Another Way
Fortunately, B2G reporting is not the only approach to international
tax information reporting.
There is another way⎯IGAs.
Many
jurisdictions entered into IGAs with the United States after FATCA’s
enactment, so that they could comply with its reporting requirements in a
way that did not violate their domestic banking or secrecy laws.144 The
following subsections will examine how IGAs mitigate conflicts between
FATCA’s reporting requirements and foreign jurisdictions’ domestic laws.
1. IGAs for Dummies
FFIs, under FATCA, can avoid being withheld upon by registering
with the IRS and agreeing to report specified information about U.S.
accounts and foreign accounts with substantial U.S. owners.145 This can be
done in one of two ways: (1) Model 1 IGAs, or (2) Model 2 IGAs.146
Model 1 IGAs are agreements between the United States and a foreign
government regarding compliance with FATCA.147 FFIs do not enter into

141

Id. at 536.
Id.
143
Id.
144
As of March 2014, more than forty jurisdictions have entered into signed IGAs with the United States.
FATCA – Archive, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/
pages/fatca-archive.aspx (last updated Sept. 29, 2014).
145
FATCA
Information for Foreign Financial Institutions and
Entities, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Information-for-Foreign-Financial-Institutions
(last
updated Mar. 17, 2014).
146
See IRS, Rev. Proc. 2014-13, 2014-3 I.R.B., FINAL FFI AGREEMENT FOR PARTICIPATING FFI AND
REPORTING MODEL 2 FFI (2014) [hereinafter Rev. Proc. 2014-13], available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/20143_IRB/ar10.html.
147
Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-1(78) (2014).
142
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FFI Agreements with the IRS under Model 1 IGAs.148 Instead, FFIs make
the required disclosures to their host country’s government, which in turn
provides this information to the IRS.149
Model 1 IGAs come in the following two flavors: (1) reciprocal, and
(2) nonreciprocal.150 As their label indicates, reciprocal Model 1 IGAs
require a dual exchange of information between the United States and a
foreign government regarding their respective resident account holders.151
On the other hand, nonreciprocal Model 1 IGAs only require the foreign
government to report this information to the United States.152 But
regardless of whether the Model 1 IGA is reciprocal or nonreciprocal, both
versions require FFIs to report specified information about accounts held by
U.S. citizens or by foreign entities controlled by U.S. citizens.153
Model 2 IGAs, on the other hand, require FFIs to directly report
information to the IRS.154 Under this approach, the foreign government
enables FFIs within its jurisdiction to “register and ‘comply with the
requirements of an FFI Agreement, including . . . due diligence, reporting,
and withholding.’”155 FATCA permits FFIs to avoid its 30% withholding
tax by entering into an FFI Agreement with the IRS, thereby agreeing to
make required disclosures.156

148

RAYMOND J. HOLST, JIYEON LEE-LIM & WILLIAM LU, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS UNDER FATCA: COMPARING THE TWO MODELS 2 (2013).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. This required information includes U.S.-taxpayer identification numbers and payments to
nonparticipating FFIs (institutions that do not comply with FATCA’s provisions). Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. These disclosures are supplemented with additional exchanges of information between the
IRS and the foreign government or its agency. Amy P. Jetel & Lauren Fitte, IRS Releases Final FFI
Agreement, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Jan. 10, 2014), http://wealth management.com/estateplanning/irs-releases-final-ffi-agreement.
156
Jetel & Fitte, supra note 155. An FFI Agreement requires participating FFIs to do the following:
(1) perform due diligence and to identify accounts held by U.S. persons;
(2) report those accounts on Form 8966;
(3) withhold and remit [a] 30 percent tax on accounts for which the withholding is
required (and file the appropriate Forms 1042, if required);
(4) report income on Form 1099 if it elects to perform full reporting (rather than 30
percent withholding) for an account holder that is a U.S. person;
(5) retain certain information on U.S. accounts and comply with IRS requests for
additional information;
(6) furnish valid withholding certificates to each withholding agent from which it
receives a withholdable payment; and
(7) close certain accounts of “recalcitrant” account holders.
Id.
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The IRS further differentiated between Model 1 and Model 2 IGAs on
December 26, 2013 when it published Revenue Procedure 2014-13 (Final
Agreement), which pertains to FFIs entering into an FFI Agreement
(participating FFIs) and FFIs treated as reporting institutions under Model 2
IGAs.157 Interestingly, the Final Agreement does not address Model 1
IGAs.158 Therefore, Model 1 IGAs permit FFIs to comply with FATCA’s
reporting requirements without having to enter into an FFI Agreement with
the IRS.159 Conversely, Model 2 IGAs require signatory jurisdictions to
comply with the terms of an FFI Agreement.160
2. Apples to Apples?: Comparing Model 1 and Model 2 IGAs
The following subsections compare the due diligence, information
reporting, withholding, and enforcement provisions of Model 1 and Model
2 IGAs. This comparison is then used to evaluate each IGA model’s
respective impact on FFIs and their host government.
a. Due Diligence
Both IGA models have similar due diligence requirements. Model 1
IGAs contain a section entitled Annex I, which lists due diligence
requirements to guide FFIs in determining what information to report to the
IRS.161 Alternatively, signatories to Model 1 IGAs may permit their FFIs to
adopt the Regulations’ stricter due diligence requirements.162 Model 2
IGAs also contain an Annex I section that lists due diligence requirements
for FFIs.163 Like Model 1 IGAs, Model 2 IGAs permit FFIs to alternatively
apply the Regulations’ requirements.164 But if FFIs choose to apply the
Regulations’ requirements, they must continually do so unless there is a
“material modification to the Regulations.”165 Additionally, Model 2 IGAs
157

Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 2014-13, supra note 146.
Jetel & Fitte, supra note 155.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
HOLST, LEE-LIM & LU, supra note 148, at 2.
162
Id. “Regulations” refer to the final and temporary regulations revising FATCA’s provisions released by
the Treasury Department and the IRS. See generally Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA (last updated
Sept. 15, 2014).
163
HOLST, LEE-LIM & LU, supra note 148, at 2.
164
Id. at 2–3.
165
Id. Nonexclusive examples of material modifications include changes to the following:
[1] The yield of a debt instrument by more than the greater of 25 basis points or 5% of
the annual yield[;]
[2] The timing of payments on a debt instrument that results in a material deferral of
158
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require FFIs to comply with the terms of an FFI Agreement.166
b. Information Reporting
In addition to the due diligence requirements discussed above, each
IGA model requires specified information reporting by FFIs. Under Model
1 IGAs, FFIs must report specified information to their host governments
that, in turn, provide this information to the IRS.167 This exchange of
information compels foreign governments to adopt and enforce laws
requiring FFIs to comply with FATCA-mandated disclosures.168 Providing
this information to the IRS is also an added administrative and financial
burden for foreign governments.169 On the bright side, however, the
growing pains might be worthwhile if the foreign government wants U.S.
financial institutions to reciprocate information about its citizens.170
Unlike its Model 1 counterparts, Model 2 IGAs cut out the middleman
by requiring FFIs to directly report information to the IRS.171 But
unfortunately for foreign governments, Model 2 IGAs still involve some
administrative and financial costs if the IRS seeks additional information
about a U.S. account holder.172
c. Withholding
Neither IGA model subjects FFIs to FATCA withholding on payments
received or made, as long as the FFIs comply with their governing IGA’s
requirements.173 But, unlike Model 1 IGAs, Model 2 IGAs have a bite. If
the IRS requests additional information about an account and the foreign
government fails to respond within six months, FATCA requires FFIs to
scheduled payments[;]
[3] The obligor or security underlying a debt instrument[; and]
[4] The nature of the obligation that causes it not to be a debt instrument.
Final FATCA Regulations Training Session #1: Update on Changes to Witholding & Grandfathered
Obligations, CITIBANK (June 2013), http://www.citibank.com/transactionservices/home/about_us/online_
academy/materials/docs/fatca_withholding.pdf.
166
HOLST, LEE-LIM & LU, supra note 148, at 3. Adherence to the terms of an FFI Agreement is not
required if a specific Model 2 IGA’s terms provide otherwise. Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. Model 2 IGAs oblige foreign governments to obtain and provide requested, additional
information to the IRS. See id.
173
Id. at 4. FFIs that fail to comply with the requirements of their governing Model 1 IGA are not
subject to FATCA withholding unless the IRS labels them as nonparticipating financial institutions. Id.
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withhold when paying the account “(i) [U.S.-source] FDAP income,
(ii) gross proceeds from the disposition of property of a type that can
produce [U.S.-source] dividends or interest or (iii) foreign passthru
payments.”174 This withholding requirement also applies when FFIs make
any of these three types of payments to nonparticipating FFIs.175
Unsurprisingly, FFIs prefer Model 1 IGAs because FATCA
withholding under them is not dependent on host governments providing
requested information to the IRS within six months.176 Compared to Model
2 IGAs, Model 1 IGAs also impose less withholding responsibility on
FFIs.177
d. Enforcement
Lastly, there is the issue of enforcement. Model 1 IGAs require
foreign governments to enact and enforce local laws to ensure that FFIs
comply with their governing IGA’s requirements.178 But under Model 2
IGAs, foreign governments do not have an enforcement role.179 Thus,
Model 1 IGAs provide FFIs with an advantage that Model 2 IGAs lack—
interaction, from the onset, with their host governments regarding
compliance with FATCA.180
Model 1 IGAs also provide foreign
governments with advantages, including increased control of FFIs within
their jurisdiction and greater transparency regarding the FFIs’ compliance
with FATCA’s provisions.181
3. Survey Says: OECD Agrees!
With FATCA and the IGA models described above paving the way,
G20 leaders endorsed the OECD proposal of an international information
exchange model in September 2013.182 This endorsement came on the
174

Id.
Id.
176
See id. at 4–5.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 5. If an FFI is noncompliant with its obligations under its governing Model 1 IGA for
longer than eighteen months, the IRS may place the FFI on a nonparticipating financial institutions list,
thereby subjecting it to FATCA withholding on payments received. Id.
179
Id. If an FFI is noncompliant with its obligations under its governing Model 2 IGA for twelve
months or more, the IRS may place the FFI on a nonparticipating financial institutions list, thereby
subjecting it to FATCA withholding on payments received. Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION 44
(2014) [hereinafter STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE], available at http://www.oecd.org/
ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-tax175
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heels of many European countries announcing their intention to implement
FATCA.183 In February 2014, the G20 leaders invited the OECD to
propose a specific standard for consideration by the G20 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors.184
Subsequently, the OECD published a 2014 report containing the
Common Reporting Standard (CRS), which specifies reporting and due
diligence procedures for financial institutions.185 The CRS, which to a large
extent was inspired by FATCA,186 contains a reporting and due diligence
standard that implementing jurisdictions must locally adopt and enforce.187
In this regard, the CRS shares some similarities with Model 1 IGAs because
both information-reporting mechanisms require collaboration with foreign
governments. But unlike the IGA models, which are distinguishable from
one another and which seek to primarily benefit the United States’ efforts in
curbing U.S. tax evasion, the purpose of the CRS is to facilitate a standard
international model of automatic information exchange. Thus, the CRS
seeks to avoid the proliferation of varying, complex, and expensive
standards for foreign governments and their financial institutions.188
Even though the CRS deviates from the IGA models in some
respects,189 both approaches are generally compatible because they adopt an
intergovernmental, reciprocal approach to international tax information
reporting.190 In addition to the CRS, the 2014 OECD report contained a
model competent authority agreement or arrangement (Model CAA), which
specifies rules governing the exchange of tax information that can be
executed within existing legal treaties or agreements.191
The 2014 OECD report also highlighted the following factors as
crucial to a successful automatic exchange model: (1) a common standard
on information reporting, due diligence, and exchange of information; (2) a
legal and operational basis for the exchange of information; and
matters.htm.
183
Id. at 5. On April 9, 2013, Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom
stated they would exchange tax information, similar to that required under FATCA, among themselves
and with the United States. On April 13, 2013, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland,
and Romania announced similar intentions. By May 14, 2013, seventeen countries endorsed a
multilateral tax information exchange approach. Soon afterwards, Mexico, Norway, and Australia
joined the club. Id.
184
Id. at 6.
185
Id. at 6–7.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 6.
189
Id. at 7. Key differences include FATCA’s U.S. citizenship-based model and its withholding tax.
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 3.
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(3) common or compatible technical solutions.192 The first factor entails
developing a wide scope for financial information that must be reported193
and then imposing these reporting requirements on an equally wide scope
of account holders194 and financial institutions.195 Furthermore, effective
procedures need to be established to ensure the quality and accuracy of the
relayed information.196
The second factor, a legal and operational basis for the exchange of
information, seeks to establish a multilateral exchange instrument to
facilitate information reporting in lieu of the bilateral treaties that currently
exist.197
The greatest advantage of a multilateral approach is its
international reach, which promotes administrative cooperation and
transparency between jurisdictions.198 Lastly, the third feature, common or
compatible technical solutions, requires standardization of reporting to keep
costs down for all participating jurisdictions.199
VI. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
FATCA is an innovative and bold piece of legislation. It is a no-holdsbarred Congressional crackdown on U.S.-source piggy banks stashed
overseas. But FFIs and foreign governments do not have to comply with an
exclusively American law, especially where the perceived headaches
associated with compliance outweigh the anticipated benefits. Fortunately,
Model 1 and Model 2 IGAs between the United States and foreign
governments provide a cooperative, coordinated, and transparent solution.
Still, bilateral IGAs are just the tip of the iceberg; their impact on
global information reporting is limited to the signatory jurisdictions.
Different jurisdictions’ IGAs will also inevitably contain varying
requirements and enforcement mechanisms. This adds greater complexity
and confusion to an already complex and confusing system of global tax
information reporting.

192

Id. at 7–9.
Id. at 7–8. The scope should be wide enough to include various sources of investment income
(e.g., interest, dividends, etc.). Id.
194
Id. “Account holders” should be defined in a manner that prevents individuals from
avoiding their obligation to report tax information through “interposed legal entities or
arrangements.” Id.
195
Id. at 8. The scope of financial institutions subject to required reporting should include banks,
brokers, and insurance companies. Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 9.
193
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The United States must therefore continue working with the OECD
towards the adoption of a multilateral, automatic information exchange
standard, which will enhance tax transparency and reduce tax evasion at an
international level. Wide-scale adoption of a standardized model will also
reduce the administrative costs of implementation, in addition to
simplifying compliance procedures for participating jurisdictions.
Consequently, nonparticipating jurisdictions will find it increasingly
difficult to resist joining the kumbaya.
Tax evasion is not a uniquely American problem. Its solution should
not be either.
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